Polska i Francja w kierunku obiecującego resetu?

Over the last month, Poland has been very advanced on the French political agenda. Or possibly we should say, erstwhile more.

French leaders, diplomats and analysts have been scrutinizing both the diplomatic rapprochement between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and president Emmanuel Macron on May 9th, as well as the presidential election leading to the triumph of the PiS supported candidate, Karol Nawrocki, on June 1st. Closely followed by Paris, these 2 major political events can appear to be puzzling. On the 1 hand, the Polish leadership is taking crucial steps in reviving its relation with Paris, Brussels and the “European liberal mainstream”. Yet, on the another hand, the Polish voters sent a conservative and Eurosceptic message to its own coalition government and to all the liberal European leaders.

But let us focus on the bilateral relations between France and Poland and on the perception that the French have now acquired of Poland’s fast-growing function in Europe.

Back to square one?

Since the appointment of Donald Tusk as prime minister on December 13th, after a tense general election, the French government had been experiencing a “Polish relief”. The “PiS decade” seemed to be over, the Weimar Triangle was back on track and political and economical ties could be revamped. Cooperation at the European level was to overcome the stumbling blocks of the constitutional and judicial strategy reforms implemented by the erstwhile Morawiecki government and the Duda presidency.

However, the triumph of Nawrocki in the second highly disputed circular of the presidential election has been seen in Paris as a setback to the possible reset in bilateral relations, as well as the “Polish normalization” hoped for by Macron. Assessing Polish political life by their own standards, the French elites branded those electoral results as “mixed messages” to Warsaw’s partners in Europe. Indeed, the PiS candidate, now president elect, who will take office on August 6th, has frequently been labelled in France as the “Polish Trump”. He is continuously criticized for his Eurosceptic stance by the ruling parties.

What seems to be mixed messages from Paris are in fact domestically understandable. The Polish political phase is, has been, and most likely will remain, divided, disputed and heated. Thus, Paris must live with a recurring question: can Poland be trusted as a reliable partner (to Macron) on the European stage? Or is the promising reset established in Nancy already ailing? Is there now any “Polish relief” or is it “back to square one”?

A individual and electoral rapprochement

To France, in the long, rich and sometimes tumultuous alliance between Warsaw and Paris, a crucial milestone was reached on May 9th in Nancy. Back then, the 2 countries added a fresh comprehensive bilateral treaty to their multilateral agreements (EU, NATO, Weimar Triangle, etc.) that have bound them together since the end of the communist bloc and the 2004 EU enlargement.

To Paris, Macron and the liberal Europhile elites of the business circles, this strategical agreement is of real substance. Many pro-government French media outlets have been highlighting the common assistance clause of the treaty, comparing it to the pre-war alliance against Nazi Germany and underlining its importance for the European Union’s defence initiatives. Within NATO and Europe, specified bilateral military agreements are rare: during the Macron presidency, the only precedent is the strategical agreement signed with Greece in 2021. And outside of Europe, France is striking specified deals only with prominent military powers specified as India, the United arabian Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This has been done in support of the country’s defence manufacture campaigns.

To a lesser extent, any diplomats and observers have emphasized that the fresh course taken by the bilateral relation has put an end to a decade-long period of partisan frictions between the PiS Polish governments and the diplomacy of Hollande and Macron. With the Morawiecki government and Macron’s time in office, relations have been at their lowest for many years.

The “Nancy sequence” is nevertheless not deprived of ambiguity from the French perspective. First, with this treaty, Paris is simply a “diplomatic follower” alternatively than a strategical pioneer. Indeed, it has been a while now since Poland has become an economical superpower in the EU. The more fresh military build-up of Warsaw has besides already taken place. Second, it can be contended that France’s rapprochement with Poland is taking place rather late due to the fact that it is prompted by partisan affinities between Macron and Tusk. The fresh treaty can even be seen as direct partisan support to the Civic Coalition run for the Polish presidential election. The strategical rapprochement is in the making but the electoral common support is even more obvious.

Catching up with a lost decade

This agreement is meant to trigger a “reset” between Paris and Warsaw. It has been branded as a “new chapter” by president Macron. The French authorities have given their best to make it symbolic and solemn, by choosing the right place and time.

As for the place, all French kids learn at school that Nancy is the urban embodiment of Polish influence in France due to the function of the Duke of Lorraine, Stanislas Leszczynski. The city shows the conventional yet structural impact of Poland in France, along with the musical works of Chopin and the technological accomplishment of Curie. Undisputedly, the fresh treaty has been signed in the most Polish town of France.

As for the time, the French presidency has chosen to sign the treaty precisely erstwhile Warsaw and Paris have converged in supporting Ukraine, resisting the fresh US presidential administration and launching a fresh European defence initiative. Killing 2 birds with 1 stone, president Macron is catching up with the Polish economical miracle and supporting the Civic Coalition electoral campaign. Indeed, the treaty goes far beyond safety and defence cooperation and cements various economical ties and endeavours.

France and Poland have been partnering for a long time in order to bolster an ambitious EU Common Agriculture Policy. They even had a clear, nonsubjective alliance throughout the PiS versus Macron controversies to defend this almost national policy against fiscal cuts. fresh fields of cooperation are now being opened up by the “Nancy spirit”, specified as atomic energy. This is likely to make business opportunities in Poland regarding the jewels of the (French) crown, specified as the major state companies EDF, Orano and Framatome.

Nuclear energy, defence, agriculture… All these topics are very dear to French (political) hearts and to Macron’s policies. 1 can say that the Polish charm offensive in France has been impressive. And that France has yet been rewarded for initiatives it did not take over the last decade.

Towards a common roadmap?

Can this agreement lead to concrete outcomes for France, Poland and the European Union? Let us put aside the tactical rapprochement, the electoral fight and the PR operations. Instead, it is better to measure the real level of possible that exists after the PiS triumph in the presidential election.

At their heart, the structural needs of the 2 countries can be combined and realigned. But at this phase we only are witnessing a convergence in the making.

Poland – even with a president supported by PiS – needs to diversify its alliance network and enlarge its hazard mitigation tools. The second Trump administration could prove be attractive for many PiS politicians. But it cannot be seen as reliable regarding the safety of the country in the long run: all Polish citizens have witnessed the way Ukraine is constantly bullied by the US, the pro-Russian stance taken by president Trump, and his negligence towards NATO commitments. In a way, Poland can usage the French strategical stance on the US to rebalance its influence on the US and in NATO.

Both countries request besides to make the most of the ReARM initiative. After all, they have large needs, enjoy solid defence industrial companies, and fear the German marketplace share in the domain.

Moreover, on Ukraine, Poland has gradually set the speech in Paris. For example, both countries now converge in their “unwavering support” to Kyiv; they share the proposition to put “boots on the ground” to safe any possible peace agreement; and they want to form the ceasefire talks on Ukraine.

May aspects of the structural bonds stay to be strengthened and disagreements to be bridged. First, economical and trade links are weak: Poland is only the tenth trade partner of France, while France is the 5th trade partner of Poland. Second, the Weimar Triangle (often declining but regularly revived) needs to be stabilized to become a more efficient scheme. The window of chance is there: Macron, Merz and Tusk have common goals. But Germany is evidently tempted to sing its own song.

The “Nancy spirit” can only become a real common roadmap if concrete actions are taken together in the long run.

Reality checks

The real impact of the 2025 bilateral treaty and the materialization of the “Nancy spirit” are to be assessed in the coming months and years. Reality checks are to be performed, especially at times erstwhile the Macron presidency is entering its last period.

Stumbling blocks are to be overcome on migration policies, Ukraine’s EU accession process (France is tempted to hold it), economical ties (Poland relies on Germany, not on France) and home political fights (PiS will stay the main mark of Macron’s European politics). advancement is besides to be made in the economical field, and fast.

Yet, Poland and France can make all the difference in making certain that Europeans have a seat at the negotiation table on Ukraine and that Germany will seriously rearm. As of today, relations between the 2 countries are proving to be promising. Let us closely follow whether the administrations will keep their promises. The reset is on its way. However, it is far from its destination.

Cyrille Bret is an associate investigator at Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors.

New east Europe is simply a reader supported publication. delight support us and aid us scope our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below.