In the fresh Polish presidential election, Karol Nawrocki – officially an independent but closely associated with the Law and Justice (PiS) organization – rode a wave of backlash against the incumbent government’s perceived ineffectiveness, and won the election. This triumph was partially based on a platform of reviving the coal manufacture and outrightly rejecting the EU’s Green Deal – which he labels “eco-madness”. Now, with veto power and a nationalist agenda, Nawrocki threatens to derail Poland’s fledgling climate strategy before it even takes shape. Warsaw’s stake in European climate policy is significant. As the EU’s fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, it accounts for nearly 11 per cent of the bloc’s net GHG emissions — placing it just behind France. Moreover, its coal-heavy energy sector is the second most carbon-intensive in the EU. Any hold in phasing out fossil fuels could seriously undermine collective climate targets. To what degree is the president-elect able to accomplish his visions, and what are the implications for the country’s agenda for energy transition?
A politicized climate policy
Climate policy has long been a profoundly politicized issue in Poland. Under the conservative, right-wing PiS government (2015–2023), coal was championed as a pillar of energy sovereignty, positioned in contrast to what the organization frequently dismissed as western “climate ideology”. Today, Poland remains the EU’s most coal-dependent country, relying on it for about 60 per cent of its electricity production. The politics of sovereignty practiced by PiS manifested most clearly in its opposition to EU climate action, peculiarly through legal challenges to the EU’s Green Deal and the Fit for 55 package in the European Court of Justice. There has besides been strategic opposition in the European Council.
The 2023 parliamentary elections brought a shift: the fresh pro-EU liberal coalition –headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk – assumed power and declared Poland’s “return to Europe”, vowing to embrace bloc-wide climate ambitions. Since taking office, the Tusk administration has put forward a draft update to the National Energy and Climate Plan, aiming for 56 per cent renewable energy in the electricity mix by 2030. There are besides plans to halve greenhouse gas emissions and cut primary energy consumption by 16.7 per cent comparative to 2020 levels. Furthermore, Poland has pledged to support the EU’s goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 90 per cent by 2040; formally endorsed a timetable to phase out coal; and signalled intent to scope climate neutrality by 2050.
However, this optimism may have been premature. Hindered by interior conflicts and opposition from the conservative president Andrzej Duda, the ruling bloc delayed political reforms. The government cited the presidential elections in 2025 as the chance to replace Duda with a candidate more favourable to its liberal agenda. Nevertheless, these hopes have not materialized. The election results are seen as a massive blow to the governing coalition and put into question Tusk’s ability to govern effectively.
Despite his run pledges to slash energy prices by 33 per cent, President-elect Nawrocki will have small power to straight steer energy policy. The competencies of the office are both limited and strategically significant. As the head of state, the president is simply a mostly ceremonial figure, charged with representing the country and upholding global treaties. Despite this, they are barred from independently negotiating them. Domestically, the president holds mostly negative prerogatives. The president’s veto power, which can be overturned only with a three-fifths majority, transforms a theoretically weak position into an obstruction tool. Currently, with the ruling parliamentary coalition short of the required constitutional majority to overrule the president’s veto, this mechanics threatens to paralyze the executive.
An obstacle to the home energy transition?
Nawrocki continues the long-standing PiS commitment to fossil fuels, positioning himself as the defender of the Polish coal mining sector — despite its decades-long decline. Today, the manufacture remains a drain on the national budget, with subsidies in 2024 nearing nine billion Polish zloty (2.1 billion euros) even as coal output and skilled labour dwindle. The government had written up a bill that would let miners to quit early and the mines to be closed in line with the planned 2049 phase-out. However, this has not been submitted for a vote due to concerns of possible blockage by the incumbent president Duda. Nawrocki in his run expressed support for the expansion of the mining industry. This calls into question whether the president-elect would follow Duda’s footsteps and veto a improvement that even miners pragmatically support.
Despite the lukewarm attitude of PiS towards energy transition, renewables have grown to constitute an expanding share of the Polish energy mix, reaching 29.6 per cent in 2024, up from 13.2 per cent in 2015. This expansion, however, appears to have occurred despite – and not due to – the erstwhile PiS government’s policies at the time. The current liberal coalition, wary of political fallout, has so far avoided negotiating with president Duda over a bill liberalizing onshore-wind regulations. Nawrocki has already voiced opposition, declaring that he “will not let abroad interests to destruct the beauty of the Polish countryside”. This stance positions him firmly against the alleged “wind turbine bill” and suggests a likely veto erstwhile he assumes office.
Challenging the EU’s climate policy
The EU’s ETS 2, an expansion of the existing Emissions Trading System, is another politically contentious issue. Like the 26 another EU associate states, Poland has delayed the implementation of the regulation that would impose carbon pricing on fuels utilized for heating and transport. The consumer-facing emissions charge is peculiarly unpopular in a country inactive heavy reliant on fossil fuels. As announced by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, the government is waiting with regards to implementation until “transition periods and price stabilization mechanisms” can be secured. A key date here is 2026, erstwhile the EU ETS directive is expected to come under the Commission’s review. Nawrocki’s position here is unambiguous: he campaigned on an outright rejection of the EU Green Deal. While it is not within the president’s power to reject or negociate EU laws, Nawrocki can origin upheaval by vetoing national provisions that ratify any fresh EU regulations. This is simply a threat he already hinted at by pledging to block any measures harming Polish agriculture, e.g. the Mercosur agreement.
The ways in which the president can derail climate policy extend beyond vetoes. By promising to organize a referendum over the rejection of the EU Green Deal and floating a summit for EU leaders critical of the agreement, Nawrocki signals an effort to circumvent the government, utilizing the presidency’s soft power to forge unofficial alliances that could undermine the climate policy of Brussels. Whether symbolic or substantive, these moves hazard turning Poland again into a rogue actor in the EU.
Outlook on the future
Nawrocki’s triumph has been celebrated in global right-wing to far-right circles. His firm aversion to what he calls “eco-terrorism” gives them hope for building interior opposition in the EU against the bloc’s climate policy. In the context of public opposition and the massive farmers’ protests the Green Deal has brought, the EU ETS 2 agreement is simply a ticking time bomb. The national fuel charge (with a combination of wider factors) almost took down the Liberal government in Canada, until it was scrapped. The EU’s leaders request to learn these lessons if they do not intend to give in to reactionary movements.
Domestically, it is likely that the president-elect will force Tusk into protracted negotiations and watered-down compromises, further hurting his government’s image. Now, the coalition faces a dual challenge: delivering desperately needed reforms while fending off Nawrocki’s populist agenda. Failure on either front would pave the way for the return to power of PiS — and with it, a rollback of efforts in liberalization.
Kamil Matusiewicz is simply a Master of Public Policy Candidate at the Hertie School.
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