At the end of 2025, Bulgaria saw mass anticorruption protests that led to the resignation of Rosen Zhelyazkov’s government (January to December 2025) and paved the way for a snap parliamentary election – the seventh 1 since 2021. In turn, in January 2026, president Rumen Radev (2017-22 and 2022-26) resigned in the hope of establishing his own political task and moving for parliament. In a televised message to the nation, he argued that Bulgaria’s democracy “could not survive” in the hands of “corrupt officials, their accomplices and extremists”. He besides said that he felt obliged to “defend statehood, the institutions, and the [nation’s] future”. As a result, Vice-President Iliana Iotova became president. She appointed a fresh caretaker government led by Andrey Gyurov in February, and scheduled the snap parliamentary election on April 19th 2026.
The latest polls from February show that Radev’s future organization may get 33.3 per cent of the vote, beating Boyko Borissov’s GERB by nearly 15 per cent. Where will these votes come from? More importantly, will Radev’s participation in the next election lead to the dismantling of the autocracy built by Boyko Borissov’s GERB and Delyan Peevski’s DPS parties and, respectively, to the strengthening of Bulgaria’s regulation of law?
Some prehistory: 5 years of voter betrayal by the opposition
The dynamic changes on the Bulgarian political phase in the past 2 months are just the latest episodes in the regulation of law crisis that sparked the mass anticorruption protests of 2020, which, in turn, perpetuated a parliamentary election spiral. Nevertheless, for the past 5 years, voters who want to see meaningful steps towards strengthening the regulation of law have been betrayed by opposition parties more curious in striking deals with the establishment behind-the-scenes alternatively than in delivering on their promises. By consequence, not only has voter turnout been steadily decreasing, but besides many disappointed citizens have become swing voters (see Table 1 below). The dynamics of voter betrayal by opposition parties, however, conditioned extremist changes in the composition of parliament as voters yet decided to show the red card to those who shamelessly lied to them.
For the first time in many years, GERB lost a parliamentary election in July 2021, which gave many false hopes that the end of autocracy was near. “There Is specified People” (ITN) came in first, earning 24.08 per cent of the vote. Yet, alternatively of working together with another opposition forces to form a government, they made a controversial “take it or leave it” offer for a cabinet composed of “experts” suspiciously close to Bulgaria’s establishment. This fundamentally prolonged the political agony and plunged the country into the next snap election.
Unsurprisingly, support for ITN plummeted to 9.52 per cent in the November 2021 election. ITN’s fast demise, however, made area for fresh contenders to play knights in shining armour on the political stage. This was peculiarly actual regarding the “We Will proceed the Change” (PP) party, which won the November 2021 election, earning 25.26 per cent of the vote. In a twist of irony, the government led by Kiril Petkov (December 2021 to July 2022), then co-leader of PP, which was, in practice, a coalition between PP, DB, ITN and BSP, fell after a successful “no confidence” vote supported by ITN. While the coalition itself can be seen as a hodgepodge formation with an unstable construction due to the fact that it united forces from different parts of the political spectrum, it is clear that ITN had successfully played the function of a “Trojan horse”. It formally joined forces with the establishment and revealed what values it truly stood for, precisely erstwhile Petkov’s government was fine-tuning the texts of anti-corruption bills.
While Petkov’s government can thus be perceived as a casualty of the deep state, PP’s subsequent controversial choices put into question its own pretences to be an authentic opposition force. alternatively of moving on its own in the April 2023 election, it ran as a coalition with “Democratic Bulgaria” (DB). While DB had been part of Petkov’s government, offering voters a PPDB package raised suspicions about PP’s ulterior motives. DB itself is simply a complex entity due to the fact that it is simply a coalition between parties many of whose recognizable personalities are dangerously close to Borissov – any of them were even part of Borissov’s first and second governments while others have a past of alignment with his GERB organization in parliament. As any of PP’s first voters see DB as part of the establishment, expectedly, PPDB’s consequence in the April 2023 election (24.56 per cent) was worse than the sum of the separate results of PP and DB in the November 2021 and October 2022 elections.
More importantly, following the April 2023 election, PP and DB’s ulterior motives became clear. Contrary to what they promised in their election campaigns and public statements, PPDB made a shameful pact with Borissov’s GERB and Peevski’s DPS, which led to the election of Nikolay Denkov’s government in 2023.
Voter turnout and results of choice parties in the last 7 parliamentary elections
Source of data: Central Election Commission of Bulgaria
Note that parties and coalitions request to pass a 4 per cent threshold to enter parliament – results below
The shameful legacy of PPDB’s Faustian bargains with DPS and GERB in 2023
When explaining the nature of Denkov’s government to their voters, PPDB avoided utilizing the word “coalition” like the plage, passionately arguing that Denkov’s cabinet was a “fit”, which was essential to implement regulation of law reforms. The “fit”, nevertheless, was not fit for purpose. Not only was Denkov’s government the incarnation of betrayal of the 2020 anti-corruption protests, which, in essence, were protests against GERB and DPS, but it besides inflicted long-term harm to Bulgaria’s regulation of law.
Beyond legitimizing the deep state, channelled by GERB and DPS, PPDB made a series of Faustian bargains with GERB and DPS, effectively helping them to capture even more institutions and to propel their autocracy. In 2023, PPDB, GERB and DPS carried out a controversial constitutional reform. 1 of its main goals was to limit the powers of the president in forming caretaker governments. This aspect of the improvement was not motivated by rule – instead, it was clearly aimed against president Rumen Radev. Prior to this reform, in case parliament could not elect a cabinet, the president appointed a caretaker government and scheduled snap elections. Following this reform, however, the president can only choice a caretaker prime minister from a predefined list – the president of the National Assembly, the politician or Vice-Governor of the Bulgarian central bank, the president or Vice-President of the Court of Auditors, and the Ombudsman or his deputy.
In parallel, PPDB helped GERB and DPS elect personalities with close ties to GERB and DPS for many of these posts, expanding the chances of ensuring GERB and DPS-dominated caretaker governments in the next 5 years. In a twist of irony, in January 2026, PPDB publicly appealed to president Iotova to appoint as caretaker prime-minister the only individual from their endorsed list who could not be suspected of links to Borissov or Peevski – the erstwhile head of the parliamentary group of PP Andrey Gurov. This only shows how displeased they were with the toxic cocktail for Bulgaria’s democracy, which they themselves helped concoct.
PPDB’s contributions to the assault on the regulation of law are, sadly, not limited to the disfiguration of the constitution. The coalition helped GERB and DPS implement a “reform” of the Anti-Corruption Commission in autumn 2023, expanding its powers but not providing adequate checks and balances. What could go wrong? PP found out the hard way later erstwhile the monster it helped make launched politically motivated proceedings against the mayor of Varna who was elected on a PP ticket.
Unsurprisingly, support for PPDB shrunk to 14.33 per cent in the June 2024 snap election and 14.214 per cent in the October 2024 snap election – their failure of appeal to voters besides meant that they were no longer of interest to the establishment itself. This opened the way for the election of Rosen Zhelyzkov’s government at the beginning of 2025 with the support of GERB, ITN, BSP and DPS.
Enter Rumen Radev: why now?
The political drama unfolding since the 2020 anti-corruption protests helps shed light on why Radev’s decision to actively join politics is timely and may be a game changer if he plays his cards wisely. Rumen Radev has won presidential elections twice, defeating GERB’s candidates at the second circular in a country in which the president is straight elected by voters. At the second circular in 2016, Radev was supported by 2,063,032 citizens, winning 59.37 per cent of the votes. At the second circular in 2021, he gained 1,539,650 votes, equivalent to 66.72 per cent of the cast ballots. As his second word is about to draw to a close and as further reelection is not possible, Radev’s moving for parliament seems like the next natural step from a political perspective.
It is besides notable that 1 of the sparks of the 2020 anti-corruption protests was the raid on Radev’s own presidency, which was perceived as a coup against his institution orchestrated by GERB and DPS. Moreover, unlike the opposition, post-2020 Radev has managed to preserve his reputation. Polls from December 2025, before his resignation, showed that he was 1 of the fewer politicians with a net affirmative rating – he benefits from 54 per cent approval and 28 per cent disapproval. The importance of these numbers can be better appreciated in comparison with another prominent opposition figures. In the same poll, Kiril Petkov (PP) benefitted from 10 per cent approval and 78 per cent disapproval.
One may hence fishy that many voters who want to see meaningful changes and who have been previously disappointed by opposition projects, specified as PP and ITN, may be tempted to vote Radev.
What follows next?
Ultimately, Radev’s possible function in the future is simply a question, first and foremost, of mathematics – will he gain adequate votes to form his own government after the April 2026 snap election, or will he gotta strike deals with another political parties? While having a tarnished reputation in the eyes of critical voters, PPDB remains the only another applicable opposition force. Yet, in the past 3 years, beyond supporting the intuitu personae amendments to the constitution, which were clearly aimed against Radev, politicians from both DB and PP have propagated biased narratives about him. It is besides apparent that PPDB are keeping the door open to negotiations with Borissov’s GERB. In another words, if Radev does not gain a solid majority in parliament, he will gotta sit at the table with PPDB and disappoint his own voters who may not forgive this easily.
More importantly, what follows next is simply a substance of principles. This is where Radev’s own character may neglect him. While an island of stableness in an ocean of disappointing politicians, Radev is not known for bold political moves. He has, sadly, a past of brave public statements, which were not followed up by concrete actions. Were these choices informed by the nature of the presidential function or by his own personality? This is simply a pivotal question whose answer may find the future of Bulgaria’s regulation of law. The country is in dire request of profound legislative and organization reforms which require character, expertise and integrity. We are yet to see if Radev and his squad will emergence to the occasion.
Dr. Radosveta Vassileva is simply a Bulgarian legal student whose investigation interests encompass EU law and comparative public and private law. She maintains a individual blog dedicated to the regulation of law in Bulgaria. She is presently Adjunct elder investigation Fellow at UCD Sutherland School of Law.
