Niemiecka perspektywa bezpieczeństwa i stabilności na Morzu Bałtyckim

With the return of a logic of competition to the Baltic Sea region, and with the increasing hazard of a wider conflict between NATO and Russia, the Baltic Sea has one more time become an area of strategical importance for Germany. Consequently, Sweden and Finland’s membership bids were unequivocally welcomed by Berlin, a sentiment reflected in the Bundestag’s close unanimous ratification of their accession protocols.

From Germany’s perspective, Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession strengthens safety and stableness in the Baltic Sea region in at least 3 ways. Each point is yet a function of how the 2 fresh members bolster NATO’s strategical posture in the region and strengthen the transatlantic alliance at large.

First, Sweden and Finland’s membership importantly strengthens NATO’s strategical posture in the Baltic Sea region and more broadly in North-East Europe. With their robust military capabilities, both are considered “net contributors” and thus valuable additions to the Alliance. Moreover, in certain respects, both are seen as models in current debates about essential reforms aimed at restoring Germany’s ability to defend itself (Wehrfähigkeit). Examples include Sweden’s approach to conscription, which, referred to as “the Swedish model”, has served as a major mention point in the German debate about the re-introduction of conscription, or Finland’s approach to civilian protection.

Second, from Berlin’s perspective, Sweden and Finland’s membership alters the strategical context in the Baltic Sea region importantly in NATO’s favour. In applicable terms, their integration into the Alliance greatly simplifies NATO’s defence planning for North-East Europe, peculiarly concerning the defence of the Baltic states. As the framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania, the Alliance’s ability to respond to a “Baltic scenario” (as a German expert late coined it) is of critical importance to Germany. By qualitatively taking their cooperation with the Alliance to a fresh level, and with NATO now being able to reliably number on their contribution to the defence of the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland’s accession solves respective strategical challenges that the Alliance has faced in the region. These include the deficiency of strategical depth, the ability to keep critical maritime connections, and, should circumstances require, decision in reinforcements and supplies. Against this background, many observers in Germany consider the Baltic states the main benefactors of these developments.

Additionally, with Sweden and Finland, Germany sees NATO better positioned to counter hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region, including attacks on critical infrastructure. The second point has become increasingly crucial amidst increasing tensions with Russia and, in light of respective high-profile incidents, including the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, specified attacks have late become a key concern for Germany.

Third, looking beyond the immediate regional context of the Baltic Sea, Berlin welcomes Sweden and Finland’s membership as it contributes to the strength of the transatlantic alliance itself, not least by fostering cohesion. Politically, their accession to NATO reinforces the centrality of the transatlantic alliance as the core pillar for safety and stableness in Europe. Furthermore, considering the capabilities they bring to the Alliance, their membership is seen to strengthen NATO’s European pillar and, by extension, to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing. Finally, since both are unchangeable democracies firmly rooted in the European mainstream, they are besides seen as reinforcing NATO’s democratic core at a time erstwhile the Alliance’s interior cohesion has increasingly become a concern for Berlin.

Thus, from Germany’s vantage point, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO is unequivocally considered a strategical gain and a welcome contribution to stableness and safety in the Baltic Sea region. Against the backdrop of rising tensions, Germany sees their membership as bolstering NATO’s strategical posture in the region, enhancing its European footprint, and strengthening the Alliance at large. While Sweden and Finland’s accession aligns with German interests in the region and creates a favourable strategical context, it remains to be seen whether Berlin can capitalize on these developments and, by adopting a more active, and indeed more potent, role, deliver the Zeitenwende in its engagement with the Baltic Sea region.

Thomas Michael Linsenmaier is an analyst at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu.